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Abstract
Based on the assumption that civic organizations may work as the most effective
institution for non-schooling citizenship education for adults, this paper examines
whether and how much Korean civic groups have played a constructive role in building
citizen capacity to participate responsibly and effectively in democratic politics. Its
conclusion is that Korean civic groups' decision to disobey the election law decreased
rather than increased a capacity for responsible citizenship.
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. Introduction
As Korea entered the postauthoritarian period, the concept of citizenship and citizenship
education gained a dynamic momentum. Citizenship is a complex concept. It refers not
only to the legal, more or less permanent membership in a political community, but
also to the possession of a capacity for political participation. This paper will focus on
the exercise of citizenship rather than its ascription, that is, the civic capacity to take
part in deliberations and decisions about matters of public concern rather than some
static set of rights and obligations.
There are many possibilities for developing and promoting citizen capacity. One can
rightly claim that the state is the primary organization responsible for the promotion of
citizen capacity. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that developing citizen
capacity is the exclusive role of the state. The nature of citizen capacity indicates that
much of the development must take place in families, neighborhood, churches, the
workplace, and voluntary associations of various sorts- in what has come to be called
"civil society." For that reason, we want a thriving civil society. Among voluntary
associations, the group of non-governmental organizations deserves special attention.
The NGOs show keen interest in politically, socially and environmentally meaningful
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issues either by aiding needy groups of people or by publicizing problems or both.
Korean examples of such organizations are the People's Solidarity For Participatory
Democracy and the Citizens' Coalition For Economic Justice. Precisely because they are
not governmental, these organizations can constitute an intermediate realm between
domestic life and the state. Furthermore, civic organizations may be regarded as a
heuristic model for the promotion of citizen capacity through non-schooling and lifelong
education. Involvement in organizations of this sort can improve communication
between individuals inside and outside of government while fostering a better
understanding of public affairs and a sense of civic responsibility.
However, how much nongovernment organizations can contribute to the promotion of
citizen capacity is an interesting and important question that this paper intends to pose.
Given the fact that not every voluntary association is an effective or appropriate
opportunity for encouraging and enhancing citizen capacity, one can rightly ask a
question of whether nongovernment organizations are well constituted to play a
constructive role in building citizen capacity. This paper attempts to evaluate the
implications of Korean non-governmental organizations for the cultivation of responsible
and informed citizenship by analyzing their involvement in the 16th parliamentary
election.
. V o l u n t a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d C i t i z e n s h i p E d u c a t i o n
Admittedly, nothing is more important to citizenship education than proper schooling,
but schooling is no longer enough. Developing and maintaining citizen capacity is
certainly a lifelong task. It is why we need institutional arrangements that provide extra
schooling for citizenship education, and encourage his or her fellow citizens to take
advantage of them. If one agrees that acquiring and maintaining citizen capacity is a
lifelong task, it is then necessary to consider a number of institutional ways to promote
citizens' doing so. There are, of course, traditional institutions such as state-supported
television, radio, and public libraries. But there are also voluntary associations such as
neighborhood and civic organizations which provide meaningful opportunities to adults
other than through schooling. In participating in organizations of civil society such as
cooperatives, professional organizations, environmental groups, neighborhood and
charitable organizations, and support groups, people can learn and exercise the civility,
self-restraint, and sense of mutual obligation that are crucial to genuine political
participation. It is thus often, even usually, the case that a "citizen governs himself most
actively in groups other than the state, groups that sometimes play an informal,
sometimes an official, role in determining state policy (W. Kymlika and W. Norman
1994, 364)." Involvement in organizations of this sort can promote citizen capacity. If
this participation often occurs close to home in neighborhood associations and civic
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organizations, it will prove especially effective at promoting citizen capacity. These
voluntary organizations are valuable and deserve continued support.
It is true that not every voluntary organization is an effective or appropriate institution
for promoting citizen capacity, but some of them are well constituted to play such a
role. In this context, some specific organizations that can play a vital role in promoting
a citizen's capacity to participate responsibly and effectively in democratic politics
deserve attention. This is the group of nongovernmental organizations that can provide
opportunities for fostering a better understanding of public affairs and a sense of civic
responsibilities by offering civic services that citizens can make use of. Usually, they are
engaged in political and social activities that deal with some of today's most serious
and urgent issues. Because they are not governmental, these organizations can provide
a healthy critique of governmental policies and practices, and, at the same time, give
politically important and technically relevant information which would enable citizens to
participate effectively in political discussion in a non-partisan way. Furthermore, they
are effective for promoting adequate citizen capacity in today's complex world by
providing relevant easy-to-understand information about issues of public concern
requiring specialists' expertise.
Taking into consideration the potential effects of civic groups on the development of
citizen capacity, the next discussion will examine whether and how much Korean
nongovernment organizations have offered meaningful opportunities for citizens to
enhance their capacity.
. General Characteristics of the Korean
Non-governmental Organizations
Traditionally, Korea has been known as having a weak civil society and an overbearing
state, but the 1990s saw a thriving civil society. It is quite remarkable that more than
2000 civic organizations-national and local-emerged and grew rapidly across the
country. They have been powerful enough to monitor National Assembly activities,
exert influence on policy issues by suggesting alternatives for government policies, and
play a great role in forming public opinion. The mass media began paying keen
attention to what civic organizations are doing or saying. The NGO leaders have been
asked for their comments and opinions whenever controversial political and social
issues emerged. Some major newspapers even assigned a space to cover the activities of
NGOs on a regular basis. A lot of volunteers including college students and
professionals have expended time and effort by participating actively in activities of
civic organizations. Among a variety of civic organizations, the People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, the Korean
Federation for Environmental Movement and the Green Korea United are prominent in
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terms of activities, popularity and influence1).
Of course, there has been some criticism about Korean civic groups. Some people have
taken issue with the insufficient participation on the part of ordinary citizens, pointing
out that civic groups in Korea have degenerated into groups without citizens. Others
have expressed concern with their undemocratic modus operandi, an elitist top-down
movement rather than a mass-oriented bottom-up one. A "catch all-movement" typical
of the Korean civic movement has been another source of criticism.
Whatever the case may be, it is true that Korean civic groups are characterized by a
catch all-movement a la department store rather than a single issue-oriented
organization. In this respect, one can say that Korean civic groups are similar to a
political party organization, which is an exception to the general trends of single
issue-oriented nongovernmental organizations in the world. Perhaps this Korean
exceptionalism is a reflection of the Korean political situation in the sense that Korean
civic groups have had to provide protection against the possibility of the overbearing
state by monitoring and checking the overwhelming power of the state. Another way of
explaining Korean exceptionalism is that civic groups have worked by appealing to
public opinion that is constantly subject to change, rather than by depending on the
common vision of principled citizens.
Certainly, Korean NGOs suffer from insufficient voluntarism, a lack of financial
autonomy and a hierarchical structure, which are contrary to the way democratic civic
organizations are supposed to work. Nevertheless, no one can doubt that Korean NGOs
have contributed meaningfully to the preservation and enhancement of Korean society's
quality ofdemocratic political life by providing citizens with opportunities to participate
in the political community. Moreover, there are remarkable achievements in terms of the
introduction of political, social and economic reforms that Korea needs. The
establishment of the real name system for all financial transactions and for the
registration of property, the cancellation of the government's plan to build a dam at the
Tong river, and enhancement of the rights of a minority of stockholders are their most
notable achievements. In particular,economic reforms have been on the agenda for civic
groups. They have pressured the crony-driven conglomerates, called Chaebol to reform
their autocratic management and enhance transparency and accountability. As a result,
it is not surprising that civic groups became the most powerful organizations feared by
the Chaebol.
1) The most salient indicator of the power and influence of Korean civic groups was the result of a
survey conducted by the Participatory Society and Hankil Research. They asked 240 respondents
consisting of politicians, government officials, mass media people and professionals about the most
powerful organization in Korea. Noless than 9.4% of the respondents chose the NGOs as the most
influential group, which means the 5th powerful organization in Korea. Its power ranked behind the
media (30.4%), the administrative branch (22.5%), the legislative branch (19.6%) and business people
(11.7%). Surprisingly, the respondents believed that the NGOs were more powerful then the judiciary
branch(5.0%) (Hankyoreh 2000, May 14, 2000).
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. G e n e r a l Election a n d Civic G r o u p s ' Decis ion t o D i s o b e y
One of the most controversial issues that confronted the Korean civic groups in 2000
was the direct intervention in the process of the 16th parliamentary election. Election
law, though revised several times in the past, had prohibited social groups except for
trade unions from getting involved in election campaigning. But as the 16th
parliamentary election drew near, civic groups decided to disobey the election law and
take action to launch their own election campaign for political reforms. On Jan. 10, 2000,
the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice laid bare relevant information about 164
members of parliament which would hurt their candidacy because of their bad
legislative activities. On Jan. 24, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy on
behalf of 412 civic, environmental and feminist groups drew up a blacklist of 68
candidates they claimed should not be elected in the parliamentary election because of
corruption, incompetence and past connections to dictatorship. After the announcement
of the blacklist, they marched to Myondong cathedral, the hotbed of prodemocracy
demonstrations in the 1980s.
But the reactions from law enforcement authorities were direct and swift. The
Commission for Election Management, the government organization responsible for the
parliamentary election, warned that the announcement of the blacklist was itself a
violation of articles 58, 59, and 87 of the election law. The prosecutors joined in the
warning, saying that actions by civic organizations were not compatible with a
law-abiding attitude and that their attempt to disregard the existing law through
disobedient actions would be a dangerous thing because it would hurt democracy
severely.
But the civic groups did not yield, and counterargued that the existing election law was
a unjust law putting severe illegitimate restraints on people's political freedom and a
citizen's right to know about candidates, and that it tended to misdirect the political
choice of the people. More concrete reasons and methods for disobeying the election
law were articulated.
First, the parliamentary election, which would take place without the amendment of the
existing law, would aggravate deep-rooted regionalism and justify a closed,
undemocratic nominating procedure by political parties, restricting severely the options
of the citizens and reproducing existing political structures. Second, their several
legislative petitions for revision of the existing election law and requests for a new law,
which would contribute to the political development and consolidation of democracy,
were ignored by the National Assembly in the past. As a result, they came to the
conclusion that it would be impossible to carryoutreforms and to change the status quo
through legitimate means and procedures in correspondence with the law. Third, given
the fact that disobedience to the existing election law would not be for the pursuit of
private interests of individuals or collective interests of social groups, but for the
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promotion ofthe common good for the country and people, civil disobedience would be
carried out in an open and public manner. Last, paying due attention to the fact that
the basic norms of civil disobedience opposed any violent acts, they would do their best
to convey their message to citizens in a peaceful and non-violent way.
But the seriousness of the matter turned out to be more than the conflict between civic
groups and law enforcement authorities. As the blacklist went public, public opinion
was divided into pros and cons. In fact, civil society divided itself with regard to the
appropriateness of the civic groups' decision to disobey the election law. Critics pointed
out that civic groups' negative campaigning was nothing but a violation of the existing
law, which would deserve legal punishment. Other people called into question the
criterion by which civic groups had chosen blacklisted candidates. In their view, the
politicians whose values civic groups had not sympathized with were simply
stigmatized as anti-reformists or persona nongrata. But considering the diversity of
democratic society, this would be an undemocratic way of passing judgement, because
it would imply an intolerance for those whose beliefs and convictions differed from
their own. Moreover, even if civic groups' intentions to disobey the election law were
motivated by a genuine zeal for common good, their unintended result would
contradict their bona fide will, leading citizens to disregard and disrespect rather than
obey law and authority in general.
But supporters were more vocal than critics. Supporters contended that the violation of
the election law could be justified by a strong will for about political reforms which
would sweep away corruption, incompetence and regionalism. The fact that other
advanced democratic countries do not prohibit social groups from launching election
campaigns on their own was cited as another reason for justifying civic groups'
disobedience. They also claimed that the election law, which allowed only trade unions'
election campaigning, was ipso facto a unjust law discriminating against other social
groups.
Meanwhile, President Kim Daejung joined the fray, sympathizing with the position of
civic groups. He argued that it would be unwise to blame or regulate the actions of
civic groups. Analogous to the April 19 and June 10 democratic movement, which had
been blamed as a violation of the existing law at first, but later could be acknowledged
to be a legitimate movement of protest, civic groups' choice was justified as a legitimate
protest against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power to make just laws. The
intervention by the president made the issue more complex. As a result of the
president's intervention, however, it became evident that civic groups did not need to
worry about the imprisonment or legal punishment which would be likely to result
from regular civil disobedient actions. Perhaps Kim had his own political reasons for
taking sides with civic groups. He hoped fresh faces would help beat the opposition
party, the current majority holder. However, his endorsement of civic groups' actions
drew sharp and vehement criticism from major newspapers and even law enforcement
authorities, which complained that the primary role of the president was to protect law
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and order.
As far as ordinary citizens were concerned, they were more than enthusiastic about the
civic movement to drive out old, corrupt politicians. 79.5% of citizens answered that
political parties should take into consideration the blacklist wholly or partially in their
process of nominating candidates (Hankyoreh, Feb 12, 2000). "Change," a pop hit,
reflected the sentiments of a majority of citizens eager to change politics and society. In
a sense, the 16th parliamentary election may be characterized as the election of young
candidates called the "Generation of 386". They were in their '30s, were radical in the
'80s and were born in the '60s. Nearly 150 of the candidates running for the National
Assembly were 386ers, and generational change is on the agenda. Young candidates
rode high on the popular civic movement to call for change. The civic movement's
message of change inspired ordinary citizens, students, college professors and
professionals alike. More than 5,000 citizens contributed financially to the fund of the
civic movement. 143 university professors across the country joined the civic movement
as an advisory group. 250 citizens volunteered to work for the office of the People's
Solidarity for General Election. Every day netizens from 3000 to 10,000 visited the
Website of the civic groups, which totalled 800,000 visits during the 3 month period
after the announcement of the blacklist.
The outcome of the parliamentary election dramatically demonstrated the power and
popularity of the civic movement calling for change. The civic groups announced that
70% of the blacklisted candidates were not successful in taking seats in the National
Assembly. Given this achievement, Park Wonsun, who masterminded and initiated the
campaign for the blacklist, was named man of the year by the press.
But it is important to note that several sorts of self-flagellation began emerging within
the civic movement. In November 2000, Seo Kyungsuk2), one of the founding fathers of
the Korean NGO movement, confessed that there was neither citizen participation nor
communication in the Korean civic movement (Chosun Ilbo, Nov 28, 2000). Although
acknowledging the remarkable achievements by the NGOs, he never hesitated to lay
bare its major vulnerabilities. In his view, neglect of the role of checking government
power, a undemocratic way of running the NGOs, financial dependence on the
government, a nonprofessional approach to social, economic and political issues,
hypersensitivity to the mass media campaign, and the morally deficient qualities of
some NGO leaders were the main factors threatening to damage the Korean civic
movement.
His main self-criticism centered on the People's Solidarity for General Election's
campaign to drive out old and corrupt politicians. His first concern was that civic
groups disassociated themselves from the civic movement's traditional tendency to
search for reasonable alternatives within the framework of law and order and became
immersed in the populist movement in which popular sentiments worked as a final and
absolute criterion. The second problem with its negative campaigning was that it acted
2) In 1989 he organized Citizens' Coalition For Economic Justice, the first NGO in Korea
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as though monopolizing the standard of justice and righteousness. The result was that
the civic movement stood above law. The third complaint was that even if the civic
movement to disobey the election law was supported by a majority of citizens, it
contributed to the decrease and marginalization of law-abiding attitudes among citizens.
In sum, his conclusion was that the process of drawing up the blacklist had the
negative effect of neglecting the fundamental agendas of political reforms such as the
minimization of deep-rooted regionalism and policy competition, and making personal
problems of individual politicians such as corruption and incompetence into prominent
political issues.
Of course, not all of the civic group leaders have agreed with his self-criticism and
self-flagellation. There are still a considerable number of civic leaders who believe that
their decision to disobey the election law was a right choice. Yet there is no doubt that
his self-criticism is valuable for those concerned with citizenship education in Korea.
. Evaluation of the Civic Movement: Implications for Citizenship
Education for Adults.
How can we evaluate Korean civic groups' decision to disobey the election law? Did it
contribute to the increase of citizen capacity to participate responsibly and effectively in
democratic politics? I assume that mere obedience to law is not always enough to make
one an active, informed, responsible citizen, but obedience is, other things being equal
(ceteris paribus), a requirement of citizenship. Of course, it is citizens' responsibility to
decide whether other things are truly equal or whether there are special circumstances
that free them-or perhaps even require them- to disobey. This being so, it is by no
means impossible for civic groups to decide to disobey. But I believe that Korean civic
groups' direct intervention in the parliamentary election at the expense of the election
law had the consequence of inhibiting rather than encouraging a citizen's capacity to
pass judgement prudently and knowledgeably about complex political matters. There
are two factors for the Korean civic groups' underachievement. That they refused to
tolerate those whose beliefs and convictions differed from their own by failing to
understand the nature of uncertainty surrounding political life was one factor. The
second problem was that theybehaved like "Platonic guardians" rather than like helpers
and advisors to ordinary citizens.
In political life we are constantly confronted with uncertainty about facts, causal
relations, and the likely consequences of government policies. Uncertainty is often
exaggerated and exploited as an excuse for inaction, yielding to political, social and
cultural establishments, or support for the status quo, but responsible citizens must also
confront genuine doubts about politics and society. Conscientious citizens need policies
to deal with factual uncertainty. That problem is complex enough, for there is no
self-evident principle of how we should decide under uncertainty even when our goals
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are clear and well-ordered. But even that is not as difficult as normative uncertainty,
that is, doubts about the requirements of political morality.
Few can be entirely sure that Korea's National Security Law is an anti-human rights
law, or that some reform programs that civic groups are eager to introduce to challenge
the Confucian, seniority-bound political, business and cultural establishments in Korean
society are desirable or even reasonable. And even a true believer in any of these issues
must concede that there are responsible and informed citizens who consciously and
sincerely hold opinions to the contrary. This is not, and need not be, an expression of
moral scepticism and emotivism; about some matters there may be no doubt. It is a
reflection of intelligent humility and the willingness to regard other citizens as our
equals. But Korean civic groups believed that they could gain nothing from the
opportunity to hear or see diverse points of view expressed
The problem of disobedience is sometimes thought to be most serious when a law is
clearly unjust. That is not quite right. O n l y w h e n a l a w i s t h o u g h t t o b e u n j u s t d o e s t h e
problem arise, but the extremely difficult cases are those in which moral and factual
uncertainty make it controversial whether or not the law is just. Moreover, there is an
important reason that responsible and informed citizens can obey unjust laws. In
Rawls's language(1971), constitutional democracy in any of its familiar forms is an
imperfect procedure with respect to justice. Given the imperfect procedural justice
inherent in constitutional democracy, there is a degree of injustice which is in principle
tolerable. Certainly, there is enough reason to assume that Korea is a constitutional
country, in particular after its transition to democracy in 1987. Then we have to leave
open the possibility that Korea has unjust laws and authority which are tolerable. But
Korean civic groups acted as though they could not tolerate any degree of injustice
whatsoever.
To be sure, the function of civic groups is to equip citizens to take part sensibly and
knowledgeably in political deliberations and decisions. It is not to give them answers or
to persuade them to accept some particular, previously determined course of action. It
is rather to help them reach sensible decisions of their own. The raison d'etre of civic
groups is to provide opportunities to increase civic competence and efficacy for citizens.
They have to acknowledge that there are alternative actions available to citizens to
secure civic ends, and that these have to be evaluated and matched with purposes and
expected outcomes. It is by no means implausible to assert thatthere are alternative and
perhaps better ways to implement reform than those that civic groups propose. Civic
organizations are thus not latter-day "Platonic guardians". They should not claim to
know precisely what to do. They can only claim to know what falls outside the range
of reasonable doings. And they must admit that their knowledge and judgement are
fallible. Their proper role in a democratic community is to provide defenses both
against demagogues who would deceive citizens with pipe dreams and against citizens'
own wishes for the unattainable.
But Korean civic organizations acted like "Platonic guardians". Though they had a
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narrow purpose and hence could address only a few political issues, they addressed
them as though they were incontestably the most urgent and important ones. Moreover,
they believed that any political issue was wholly isolable from all other ones, failing to
understand that their decision to disobey law and authority would have some serious
negative implications for responsible and informed citizenship.
Instead of marking off the boundaries within which reform proposals must remain if
they were to be responsible, if they were not to be fatuous or worse, Korean civic
groups made specific political decisions. Given the peculiarity of the Korean political
situation, of course, they were in a strategic position to advocate a specific course of
action. But what they failed to understand was that what they advocated should be
regarded as no more than one opinion among many considered by responsible and
informed citizens in their political deliberations and decisions. Political debate among all
competent citizens could have determined which of the available responsible actions to
take in the 16th parliamentary election. It was by no means unreasonable for political
debate to contest the political agenda that civic groups proposed. But by endorsing a
specific course of action (that of disobedience) instead of confining themselves to
demarcating the domain of defensible proposals, civic groups refused to remain
advisers. They became civic rulers dictating ordinary citizens what to do .
. Conclusion
I believe that if they had acted like advisers rather than "Platonic guardians," and
offered their reform program as no more than one proposal among many considered by
ordinary citizens in their political deliberations, civic groups' campaigning could have
made cases that could actually serve to increase citizens' capacity rather than bring
damage and instability to the society. It is ironic that the civic groups' reformist ardor
to challenge the corrupt and incompetent political establishments in Korea turned out to
be an inhibiting rather than encouraging factor for citizens' capacity to participate
responsibly and effectively in politics. Civic groups' intervention had the consequence of
stripping citizens of opportunities to exercise political and cultural initiative to bring
about something new and different. If civic groups offered their specific course of action
as the most urgent and important one, how could citizens decide on which form of
civic action was the most appropriate? In short, the civic groups' choice for disobedience
came at the expense of the democratic ideals of citizenship and citizen capacity.
Like everything political, no organization is ever perfect. These imperfections exist in
Korean civic organizations as well. To overcome organizational imperfections, Korean
civic groups should be open to and, in some respects, in search of reform. But
responsible reform cannot move in the direction of replacing the active role of
responsible and informed citizenship. The concept of responsible and informed
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citizenship that I have proposed in this paper requires a modesty and diligence in
Korean civic groups' reformist ardor that will accustom them to working with diverse
people with diverse interests and diverse beliefs for fostering the cause of democratic
politics. It calls for them to eschew a disregard of and a despair about the existing
conditions of political life in Korea and to reject a pipe dream of political messianism.
It calls, instead, for them to embrace a life of political participation marked by courage,
prudence, patience and tolerance.
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